Subsystem 09 of 12 · Dust
Lunar Habitat ACT, the Autonomous Construction Testbed·Dust·Concept definition, revision A·August 2026·See it in the tour

The consumable nobody budgets for

Gene Cernan told the Apollo 17 debrief that dust was probably the greatest inhibitor to a nominal operation on the Moon, the one problem the crews could not overcome. It is jagged, electrostatically charged, and it gets into everything. The design spends its effort on keeping it out: rear entry suit ports so the suit never comes inside, electrodynamic clearing on every exposed face, and sintered roads so traverses stop throwing it.

10 to 20%of regolith mass below 20 µm
2moonwalks to a leaking suit seal on Apollo 12
96%capture target
Contents
  1. Why lunar dust is not like dust
  2. The strategy: never let it inside
  3. Suit ports
  4. Electrostatic mitigation
  5. What still wears out
  6. Roads, and why they are a dust measure
  7. What is not yet known
  8. Increment plan
  9. Sources and further reading
Section 01

Why lunar dust is not like dust

Terrestrial dust has been rounded by wind and water for millions of years. Lunar regolith has been shattered by micrometeorite impact in vacuum and never weathered, so the grains are sharp, angular and often glass. Under a microscope they look like broken bottles.

They are also electrostatically charged, by solar ultraviolet on the sunlit side and by plasma on the night side, which makes them cling to everything. Whether charged grains loft in any quantity is less settled than it was: the Lunar Atmosphere and Dust Environment Explorer (LADEE) set an upper limit of 100 grains per cubic metre for electrostatically lofted dust between 3 and 250 km altitude, and found instead a thin cloud kicked up by micrometeoroid impacts. Ten to twenty percent of the soil mass is finer than 20 micrometres, and the fraction that matters for the lung is finer still, below about 3 micrometres. NASA's permissible exposure limit for a six month mission is 0.3 mg of respirable dust per cubic metre of cabin air.

PropertyLunar regolithTerrestrial dustConsequence
Grain shapeAngular, fractured glassRounded by weatheringAbrades seals, bearings and visors
ChargeElectrostatically chargedMostly neutralClings, levitates, resists brushing
Sizebelow 20 µm10 to 20% by massVaries with sourceThe respirable fraction below 3 µm reaches the alveoli
Reactivityfreshly fracturedHighly reactive surfacesPassivatedSuspected inflammatory response in lung tissue
AbrasivenessHard silicate minerals and glassSofter, weathered grainsWore through the outer suit layer on Apollo 12 in two extravehicular activities (EVAs)
What Apollo actually found

After two EVAs and about eight hours outside, the Apollo 12 suits were worn through the outer layer above the boots and into the insulation beneath, and Pete Conrad's suit, which had no leak before the first EVA, was losing 0.25 psi a minute against a 0.30 limit. Wrist locks and hose locks clogged. On Apollo 17 the cover gloves used on the core drill were worn through after two EVAs and discarded, Harrison Schmitt's visor sunshade was scratched until he could not see out in some directions, and after removing his helmet in the cabin he reported nasal and sinus stuffiness he compared to hay fever, from dust carried inside on the suits. Apollo 17 spent 75 hours on the surface. This base is planned for a decade.

Section 02

The strategy: never let it inside

Every dust mitigation approach falls into one of three categories: stop it entering, remove it once it has, or tolerate it. Cleaning is expensive in crew time and never complete, and tolerance is what wore out the Apollo suits. So the architecture spends its effort almost entirely on the first category.

Surface unlimited dust Suit exterior stays outside Suit port hard boundary Airlock second boundary Crew volume clean docked sample transfer crew only
The suit never comes inside. A rear entry suit stays docked on the outside of the hull and the crew climb in and out from within, so the contaminated surface and the clean volume are never in the same place at the same time. Samples pass through a separate transfer lock.
Section 03

Suit ports

The suit port is the single most important dust decision in the design, and it happens to also solve two other problems.

It removes the dust path entirely, because the suit exterior is always outside. It removes the airlock pump down, because only the small vestibule behind the hatch is ever cycled; NASA's suit port work at Johnson Space Center puts the time before an EVA at under thirty minutes against hours through an airlock. And with the cabin held at NASA's exploration atmosphere, 8.2 psi and 34 percent oxygen, the prebreathe falls to about fifteen minutes.

MeasureTraditional airlockSuit portDifference
Dust path into the habitatEvery EVANoneThe whole problem
Time before an EVAHoursUnder 30 minTwo EVAs a day become possible
Atmosphere lost per cycleThe airlock volume, pumped or ventedOnly the vestibule behind the hatchMost of the consumable; not yet measured for this design
PrebreatheHours from a 14.7 psi cabinAbout 15 min from 8.2 psi, 34% oxygenRemoves the largest EVA overhead
Suit stowage insideEvery suit, in the cabinNone, the suits stay docked outsideVolume and dust both stay outside
Section 04

Electrostatic mitigation

What the boundary does not catch is handled electrically. An electrodynamic dust shield (EDS) is a set of transparent electrodes on a surface, driven with out of phase high voltage waveforms that make a travelling electric field. Charged particles are walked along the surface and off the edge. It has no moving parts and costs almost nothing in mass. NASA's Kennedy Space Center exposed EDS panels on the station's Materials International Space Station Experiment (MISSE 11) from 2019, and on 2 March 2025 an EDS landed on Blue Ghost and cleared regolith from glass and thermal radiator samples on the surface, the first such demonstration on the Moon.

It is used on three things here: the solar array faces, the radiator faces, and the airlock curtain the crew pass through. On the array it is what keeps the site's own traffic from settling on the cells: the Apollo dust detector experiments found that dust, not radiation, was the main cause of degradation of their covered solar cells.

18 Wper array face, allocation
0moving parts
0 hcrew time
96%capture target, to be shown below 3 µm
Section 05

What still wears out

No mitigation is complete, so the design assumes wear and plans for replacement rather than pretending it will not happen.

Expected service life against dust exposure Suit outer layer 620 hours EVA hours, then replace Suit wrist and ankle seals 340 hours the first thing to go Rover wheel bearings 1800 hours sealed and graded roads help Airlock hatch seal 2400 hours inspected every 90 days Visor outer shield 480 hours sacrificial, cheap, replaced often Connector dust caps 900 hours Every one of these is a scheduled replacement item, and the spares mass is in the resupply budget.
The wrist and ankle seals are the shortest lived and the most consequential, so they are treated as a consumable: inspected after every EVA, replaced on a fixed interval rather than on condition, because a seal that is visibly worn has already been leaking. The hours are design estimates, see section 07; the Apollo record behind them is two EVAs to a leaking suit.
Section 06

Roads, and why they are a dust measure

A rover crossing unprepared regolith throws a rooster tail of fines that travels ballistically in vacuum and settles across the whole site. Every traverse contaminates everything downrange of it, including the array and the radiators.

Sintering the routes between the four work areas is usually presented as a mobility improvement. It is at least as much a contamination control measure: a vitrified surface generates almost no fines, so the dust budget of the whole site falls with every metre of road laid. This is the argument for building roads early rather than when they are convenient.

Section 07

What is not yet known

The toxicity of lunar dust is bounded, not settled. NASA's 0.3 mg per cubic metre limit rests on animal studies with pulverised Apollo soil and sits at the low end of a 0.2 to 0.7 range from different methods; whether freshly fractured polar regolith, never exposed to air, behaves the same as returned samples is unknown. The size distribution at the Shackleton rim has not been measured, so the fraction below 3 micrometres that the airlock curtain has to capture is assumed from equatorial and mid latitude samples. Every service life in the chart is an estimate until the increment four particle counters report; the only measured record is Apollo's, and it ends at 75 hours. The suit port's gas loss per cycle has not been measured for this design, and the electrodynamic shield's power and its lifetime under years of ultraviolet and thermal cycling are known from a two week demonstration and a station exposure, not from a decade. Whether charged dust lofts in quantity near the terminator is now doubtful after LADEE, but the site sits at the terminator for months at a time, which no instrument has yet watched.

Section 08

Increment plan

Increment 1, suit ports from the start

This is not retrofittable. The airlock is designed around suit ports or it is not, so it lands with them.

Increment 2, electrostatic curtain and vacuum station

The airlock interior fit out, and the first electrodynamic shields on the array.

Increment 3, sintered roads

The four routes between habitat, pad, plant and excavation face. This is where site wide dust generation drops sharply.

Increment 4, monitoring

Particle counters in each module and on the array, so degradation is measured rather than inferred. Nobody has ever had long duration dust data from the surface.

Sources

Sources and further reading

Every figure in this document traces to one of these. Agency documents and peer reviewed work first, reporting only where it is the primary record.

Gaier, the effects of lunar dust on EVA systems during the Apollo missions, NASA 2005The primary record: suit wear, seal leak rates, clogged locks and the Cernan quotation
Wagner, the Apollo experience lessons learned for Constellation lunar dust management, NASA 2006Schmitt's lunar hay fever and the cabin dust record
NASA human research roadmap, permissible exposure limits for inhalation of lunar dustThe 0.3 mg per cubic metre limit and the 0.2 to 0.7 range behind it
NASA evidence report, risk of adverse health effects from lunar dust exposureRespirable fraction and the inflammatory response
Lunar Sourcebook, chapter 7, the lunar regolithGrain size distribution: 10 to 20 percent finer than 20 micrometres
NASA, dust shield successfully repels lunar regolith on the Moon, 2025The Blue Ghost demonstration on glass and radiator samples
Electrodynamic dust shield preparation for MISSE 11 launch, NASA 2018The station exposure that preceded the lunar flight
Suitport feasibility, NASA Johnson Space Center 2012Pre EVA time from hours to under thirty minutes; the exploration cabin pressure
Modeling a 15 minute EVA prebreathe protocol using NASA's exploration atmosphere, Acta Astronautica 2015The 8.2 psi, 34 percent oxygen cabin and the fifteen minute prebreathe
Szalay and Horanyi, the search for electrostatically lofted grains above the Moon with the Lunar Dust Experiment, Geophysical Research Letters 2015The LADEE upper limit on lofted dust
Hollick and O'Brien, lunar weather measurements at three Apollo sites 1969 to 1976, Space Weather 2013Dust as the main cause of solar cell degradation
Apollo 17 mission details, NASAThe 75 hour surface stay and three EVAs